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Terrorism and Cyber Attacks 
as Hybrid Threats: Defining 
a Comprehensive Approach 
New potential threats arose from both state and non- 
state actors with the advent of new technologies, the 
growth of the Internet, and the proliferation of privately 
owned computer  hardware. These increasingly sophis- 
2
 
for Countering 21st Century ticated threats include the use of cyber as a means of  
Threats to Global Peace and 
Security 
 
By Dr. Sascha-Dominik Bachmann and 
Dr. Håkan Gunneriusson 
 
Abstract 
Multimodal, kinetic and non-kinetic threats to international 
peace and security, including cyber-attacks, low intensity 
asymmetric conflict scenarios, global terrorism, piracy, trans- 
national organized crime, resources security, retrenchment 
from globalization and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, were identified by NATO as ‘hybrid threats,’ 
which state actors are ill-equipped to handle. This interdis- 
ciplinary article predicts that military doctrines, traditional 
concepts of war and peace, and legal perceptions will be 
challenged by the nature of these threats. 
 
Introduction and Overview 
The drastic global changes since the end of the Cold War 
had a permanent impact on military operations and doc- 
trine. The last quarter century saw state actors adopt several 
distinct approaches to dealing with threats. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991 removed the original raison d’etre 
of the Warsaw Pact: the specter of repelling a Soviet attack 
on the West through the Fulda gap in Germany.1  The end of 
the balance of power that existed after the Second World 
War led to a proliferation of armed conflicts around the 
globe. Recently, it appeared the global community con- 
doned the use of inter-state force highlighted by the ‘War 
on Terrorism’, the Russian-Georgian conflict of summer 
2008, and the Libyan Intervention of 2011. However, if any 
state or non-state actor wanted to target a Western Euro- 
pean state by using conventional means of warfare, they 
would face significant risks of retaliation. 
 
1  Referring to the German lowlands between Frankfurt am Main 
and the former East German border, which was regarded as the most 
likely terrain for a Soviet led attack by the Warsaw Pact. 
warfare and have further blurred the traditional distinction 
between war and peace. Such a distinction was replaced 
by the recognition of the need to counter new, multi modal 
threats, which have little in common with past examples of 
interstate aggression. These new threats to global peace and 
security seriously threaten the modern Western way of life 
within the context of the present ‘steady state’ environment 
at home (and before the backdrop of the ongoing asym- 
metric conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mali, Somalia, and 
Yemen). 
This article aims to introduce this form of security threat 
under inclusion of aspects of cyber-terrorism and cyber- 
warfare. It presents the findings of an ongoing hybrid threat 
experiment that was undertaken by the Swedish National 
Defence College. It briefly reflects on how hybrid yhreats 
may impact on military thinking in the developed world. 
Additionally, it argues that the 2010 ICC Review Confer- 
ence in Kampala’s codification of the crime of aggression 
does not necessarily reflect these new forms of 21st century 
threats. 
This article3 consists of three parts: First, it introduces 
the notion of ‘hybrid threats’  as a new threat definition and 
its (at least temporary) inclusion in NATO’s new compre- 
hensive defense approach with a reflection on the use of 
cyber capabilities. Second, inclusion is highlighted at the 
 
 
2  The term “cyber” is used in a wider sense, referring to the use of 
computer technology and the Internet for operations outside the 
four traditional arenas of land, sea, air, and space. Cyber operations, 
cyber war, and cyber-attacks are examples of such operations. For a 
classification of cyber conflicts, see Michael Schmitt, “Classification 
of Cyber Conflict," 17 (2) JCSL (2012), 245-260. 
 
3  The authors have undertaken some prior work in that field: See 
Sascha-Dominik Bachmann and Gerhard Kemp “Aggression as ‘Or- 
ganized Hypocrisy’ – How the War on Terrorism And Hybrid Threats 
Challenge The Nuremberg Legacy," Windsor Yearbook of Access to 
Justice (2012); Sascha Bachmann “NATO’s Comprehensive Approach 
to Counter 21st Century Threats – Mapping The New Frontier of 
Global Risk and Crisis Management, 88 Amicus Curiae 2012; and 
Sascha Bachmann and Håkan Gunneriusson “Countering Terrorism, 
Asymmetric and Hybrid Threats: Defining Comprehensive Approach 
for 21st Century Threats to Global Risk and Security,” Swedish MoD – 
High Command, Internal Paper, releasable to the public. 
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multinational level through case study examples of NATO 
and UN initiatives and inclusion is examined at the state 
level through a case study of the Swedish National De- 
fense College. Third, it addresses potential implications for 
military doctrine arising from hybrid threats and the associ- 
ated legal consequences. The article concludes with a brief 
outlook on the new dimensions of possible future threats to 
peace and security as challenges to our present concept of 
war and peace, and then reflects on possible responses. 
 
New Security Challenges: The Emer- 
gence of ‘Hybrid Threats’ as Challenges 
to Peace and Security 
Multimodal, low intensity, kinetic as well as non-kinetic 
threats to international peace and security including cyber 
war, asymmetric conflict scenarios, global terrorism, piracy, 
transnational organized crime, demographic challenges, 
resource security, retrenchment from globalization, and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were identified 
and labelled by NATO as ‘Hybrid Threats’, as threats ‘posed 
by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ 
conventional and non-conventional  means adaptively in 
pursuit of their objectives’.4 
Having identified these threats, NATO undertook work 
on a comprehensive conceptual framework, a Capstone 
Concept, which was to provide a legal framework for iden- 
tifying and categorizing such threats within the wider frame 
of possible multi-stakeholder responses. In 2011, NATO’s 
Allied Command Transformation (ACT) supported by the 
U.S. Joint Forces Command  Joint Irregular Warfare Centre 
(USJFCOM JIWC) and the U.S. National Defence University 
(NDU) conducted specialized workshops related to ‘Assess- 
ing Emerging Security Challenges in the Globalized Envi- 
ronment (Countering Hybrid Threats [CHT]) Experiment’.5 
These workshops took place in Brussels, Belgium,  and 
Tallinn, Estonia, and aimed at identifying possible threats 
and to discuss some key implications when countering such 
risks and challenges. The findings of the workshops were 
 
 
4   Cf. BI-SC Input for a New NATO Capstone Concept for The Military 
Contribution to Countering Hybrid Enclosure 1 to 1500/CPPCAM/ 
FCR/10-270038 and 5000 FXX/0100/TT-0651/SER: NU0040, dated 25 
August 2010. 
 
5  See NATO’s Transnet network on Countering Hybrid Threats (CHT), 
https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/Transforma1/ACTIPT/JOUIPT. 
published in the ACT’s final report and recommendations in 
2011.6 
Hybrid threats faced by NATO and its non-military 
partners require a comprehensive approach allowing a wide 
spectrum of responses, kinetic and non-kinetic by military 
and non-military actors.7  Such a comprehensive response 
will have to be in partnership with other stakeholders such 
as international and regional organizations  as well as repre- 
sentatives of business and commerce.8  However, due to a 
lack of financial resources in general, and an absence of the 
political will to create necessary ‘smart defense’ capabilities 
among its member  states, NATO decided in June 2012 to 
cease work on CHT at its organizational level while encour- 
aging its member  states and associated NATO Excellence 
Centers to continue working on hybrid threats. 
 
Case Studies 
Prior to the ACT’s report and recommendations, NATO 
held a summit in Lisbon, Portugal.  The participants dis- 
cussed general challenges to the alliance’s present role in 
the face of falling national defense budgets. It was at this 
summit that the Lisbon Summit Declaration of 2010 was 
drafted. New threat scenarios were addressed in the Decla- 
ration, threats which differed from traditional ‘state on state’ 
armed conflict scenarios, and were discussed in reaction to 
increased globalization.9  As a consequence, NATO adopted 
a new Strategic Concept. The Strategic Concept set out 
its vision for the immediate future, and called for “NATO’s 
 
 
6 Assessing Emerging Security Challeges in the Globalized Environ- 
ment,” NATO Allied Command Transformation, https://transnet.act. 
nato.int/WISE/CHTIPT/Newsletter/JanuaryCHT/file/_WFS/CHT%20 
Newsletter%20-%20Edition%201%20-%20final.pdf. 
 
7  See “Updated List of Tasks for the Implementation of the Compre- 
hensive Approach Action Plan and the Lisbon Summit Decisions on 
the Comprehensive Approach," March 4, 2011, 1-10, https://jadl. 
act.nato.int/NATO/data/NATO/lm_data/lm_12820/999/objects/ 
il_0_file_35471/20111130_NU_NATO-IS-NSG-PO(2011)0529-Action- 
Plan-Comprehensive-Approach.pdf. 
 
8  Michael Miklaucic, “NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat,” Septem- 
ber 23, 2011, http://www.act.nato.int/multimedia/archive/41%E2% 
80%90top%E2%80%90headlines/747%E2%80%90nato%E2%80%90c 
ountering%E2%80%90the%E2%80%90hybrid%E2%80%90threat. 
 
9  North Atlantic Treaty Organization Public Diplomacy Division, “Lis- 
bon Summit Declaration," last modified November 20, 2010, http:// 
www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_11/2010_11_11de1 
db9b73c4f9bbfb52b2c94722eac_pr_cp_2010_0155_eng-summit_lis- 
bon.pdf. 
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evolution, so that it [could continue] to be effective in a 
changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities 
and new partners”.10 
NATO’s main objective, however, remained the capabil- 
ity to counter any threats faced by its member  states. But 
this understanding changed to include threats posed by 
traditional external security threats as well as internal  secu- 
rity threats from new sources, including  terrorist attacks in 
the context of ‘homeland security.’ NATO’s original role of 
protecting its member states from the threat of aggression, 
and doing so by all political and military means necessary, 
has slowly been amended to reflect new threat scenarios, 
including  acts by non-state actors in response to the attacks 
on September 11, 2001.11 
In the autumn of 2012, the Swedish National Defense 
College conducted a hybrid threat experiment, using similar 
situations to those contemplated by NATO.12 The experi- 
ment scenario centered on an imaginary island kingdom 
in the middle of the Baltic Sea, which faced growing 
economic, social, and political challenges. The situation 
in the fictional kingdom had deteriorated to the point that 
neighboring  states, including  Sweden, were directly affected 
by a mix of traditional and hybrid threats. The experiment 
participants were asked to pretend to be a committee of 
advisers for the Swedish government and were tasked with 
advising the Swedish Government on how to handle the 
issues presented  by its fictional neighbor. The participants 
were instructed to represent the industries that they worked 
for in real life. The experiment participants included mem- 
bers of the Swedish armed forces, Swedish national support 
agencies, the university sphere, the pharmacological indus- 
try, the banking industry and the internet security industry. 
The experiment participants were given a wide range of 
new and threatening situations to contemplate and pro- 
vide solutions for the Swedish Government. The situations 
created by the imaginary hostile state included (1) cyber 
 
 
10  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Active Engagement, Modern 
threats, including defacing government sites; (2) threats to 
hack and stop the pacemaker of a high ranking Swedish 
government official; and (3) the destruction of a turbine in 
a nuclear power station using a computer worm, similar 
to the “Stuxnet” attack in Iran.13 Traditional threats were 
also contemplated,  and included (1) the attempt to sink a 
hijacked oil tanker in the middle of a sensitive maritime 
environment zone; (2) inserting a small group of Special 
Forces Operatives into Swedish territory; and (3) hiring 
Somali pirates to hijack Swedish vessels just off of the Horn 
of Africa. 
The experiment reflected both the strengths and weak- 
nesses of Swedish democratic society when facing multi- 
modal threats. The experiment showed that the existing 
Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs) allowed for efficient 
responses to certain threats, by addressing how Swedish 
government agencies and even certain NGOs should react 
in times of emergency. This was mostly due to a previously 
established command and control, as well as communica- 
tion and coordination assets within the central authority. 
However, the experiment also showed the existence of 
shortcomings within Swedish society when countering multi 
modal threats. This was due to the absence of a nation- 
ally defined comprehensive approach for joint inter-agency 
cooperation. This lack of comprehensive joint action and 
coordination  was highlighted by the fact that the Swedish 
Government did not have the authority to direct and con- 
trol the work of autonomous subordinate agencies. 
The participants of the Swedish experiment recog- 
nized that modern conflicts with hybrid elements would lead 
to new levels of threat and response complexity.  They noted 
that to combat these new complexities, there needed to be 
an active, uniform and collective leadership - some- thing 
beyond the standard operation procedures.14  The 
participants identified that a major weakness was the lack 
of a comprehensive coordination and response between 
agencies, including  the armed forces, the civil defense as- 
sets, and other civilian actors – such as IT specialists and 
Defence,” last modified November 19, 2010, http://www.nato.int/    
cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm. 
 
11  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Statement by the North At- 
lantic Council,” last modified September 15, 2001, http://www.nato. 
int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm. 
 
12  Juhapekka Rautava, “Countering Hybrid Threats: CHT Seminar” 
lecture, Swedish National Defence College, 2012. 
13  Jonathan Last, “How Stuxnet is Scaring the Tech World Half to 
Death," The Weekly Standard, last modified September 30, 2010, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/how-stuxnet-scaring-tech- 
world-half-death. 
 
14  Regarding details for the SNDC-symposium, contact Håkan Gun- 
neriusson at hakan.gunneriusson@fhs.se. 
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pharmaceutical experts 15 
Recently, the shortcomings addressed by the Swed- ish 
study were proven to be accurate. Swedish counter- 
terrorism and intelligence agencies failed to cooperate and 
operate jointly when facing a recent national threat. The 
country was left vulnerable to acts of terrorism, causing 
the director and deputy director of the National Center for 
Counterterrorism to resign in protest.16 With a shrinking 
defense budget, the downscaling of national agencies and 
society’s inability to accept the existence of such threats as 
future possibilities, it seems unlikely that these shortcomings 
will be addressed in the near future. 
 
NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to 
Countering Hybrid Threats: Challenges 
and Missed Opportunities 
The 2011 “Jasmine Revolution” in North Africa exemplified 
the types of problems addressed in the Swedish study, and 
showed how such threats could become a reality. It also 
demonstrated a range of new, multimodal hybrid threats, 
including (1) failed state scenarios; (2) civil unrest; (3) the 
proliferation of sophisticated weaponry systems to regional 
extremist groups;17  (4) the threat of proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction; and (5) the prospects of mass migration 
into Europe. 
The novel concept of hybrid threats first gained recogni- 
tion when Hezbollah had some tangible military success 
against the Israeli forces during the Second Lebanon War in 
including ‘cyber’ attacks, ‘bio- hacking’19, the ‘abuse’ of 
nanotechnology, and plain acts of global terrorism.20  If any 
state or non-state actor wanted to target a Western Europe- 
an state by using conventional means of warfare they would 
face significant risks of retaliation. 
The military engagement by NATO in the Libyan conflict 
highlighted how quickly the organization could be drawn 
into military combat operations, when requested to contrib- 
ute militarily to peace enforcement combat operations and/ 
or ‘stability operations’21. Libya also showed how NATO can 
contribute militarily to a UN authorized ‘use of force’ peace 
enforcement operation in the context of the UN’s emerg- 
ing ‘R2P’ responsibility.22  ‘Operation Unified Protector’ also 
showed an apparent rift among NATO’s  member  states in 
terms of willingness and ability to commit military assets: 
only half of NATO’s 28 states actually committed military 
assets to the operation. 
Since then, the UK and France have been discussing 
changes to voting procedures in NATO as well as new 
bi-national military cooperation agreements in order to 
overcome acute mission shortcomings in the future. Canada 
stopped participating in the NATO AWACS program 
altogether  as a direct consequence to Germany’s decision 
to halt its participation  in AWACS operations during the 
conflict. The present situation in Syria seems to constitute 
more or less a repeat of these rifts and differences among 
the alliance’s member  states (with perhaps the exception 
of the position towards Turkey and its request for NATO 
2006. Ironically, the definition of ‘hybrid’ then was that a    
non-state actor showed military capabilities originally only 
associated with state actors.18  Since then, the idea of hybrid 
threats has become associated with a new threat dimension 
 
 
 
 
15  Ibid. 
 
16  Sveriges Radio, “Spy Executives leaves cooperative body in pro- 
test,” last modified November 04, 2012, http://sverigesradio.se/sida/ 
artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=5334446. 
 
17  Harel Amos and Avi Issacharoff, “Hamas boosting anti-aircraft 
arsenal with looted Libyan missiles,” The Free Republic, last 
modified October 26, 2011, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/ 
news/2798512/posts. 
 
18  See e.g. Matt M. Matthews, “We Were Caught Unprepared: The 
2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War,” (Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort 
Leavenworth, 2008). 
 
19  An unnatural high percentage of children got Nacrolepsy in 
Scandinavia by birdflue vaccine, some genes was sensitive, http:// 
birdflu666.wordpress.com/2012/02/24/5740/. 
 
In 2010, the town  Östersund was affected by Cryptosporidium, a 
parasite which uses humans (and other animals too) as hosts for 
its reproduction. http://www.smittskyddsinstitutet.se/nyhetsar- 
kiv/2010/smittskyddsinstitutets-arbete-med-det-vattenburna-ut- 
brottet-av-cryptosporidium-i-ostersund/. 
 
20  Hakan Gunneriusson, “Nothing is taken serious until it get seri- 
ous,” Defence Against Terrorism Review, no. 1 (2012). 
 
21  For a definition US Army Field Manual (FM) 3–07, see Stability 
Operations, defined broadly as “the Army’s approach to the conduct 
of full spectrum operations in any environment across the spectrum 
of conflict,” http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-07.pdf. 
 
22  Also referred to as ‘RtoP’, describing the international respon- 
sibility to protect humans from genocide and crimes and humanity 
and manifest in UN GA Resolution A/RES/63/308 on the Responsibil- 
ity to Protect. 
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PATRIOT missiles to enhance its defence capability towards 
any Syrian air attack). 
Pre-dating these events was NATO’s Lisbon Summit 
Declaration of 2010, which discussed general challenges 
to the alliance’s present role before the backdrop of falling 
national defence budgets. New threat scenarios, which dif- 
fer from traditional ‘state on state’ armed conflict scenarios 
were discussed, often in the context of increasing global- 
ization.23 As a consequence, NATO adopted a new strategic 
concept which sets out its vision for the immediate future 
and calling for “NATO’s evolution, so that it continues to 
be effective in a changing world, against new threats, with 
new capabilities and new partners”.24  The alliance’s main 
objective, however, remains the capability to counter any 
threat arising for any of its member  states posed by both tra- 
ditional external security threats as well as internal  security 
threats from a new source, including terrorist attacks in a 
‘homeland security’ type of context. This original role of 
protecting NATO’s member states from aggression or the 
threat of it, by all political and military means necessary, is 
slowly being amended to reflect on new threat scenarios, 
which include acts by non-state  actors, as NATO’s response 
to ‘9/11’ highlights.25 
If NATO had decided to adopt the comprehensive ap- 
proach  as part of its strategic framework,  then this would also 
have been beneficial for shaping the alliance’s future role. 
NATO faces the prospect of changing mission roles, 
shrinking national defense budgets and general identity 
issues surrounding organization its existence: its traditional 
role as provider  of military capabilities for its member states, 
as part of a collective self-defense effort, or for the U.N., 
in cases of U.N. Charter Article 51 authorizations, would 
have been complemented by tasks of global risk and crisis 
 
 
23  NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ 
natolive/official_texts_68828.htm. 
 
24 “Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” of 19 November 2010, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm and 
Lisbon Summit Declaration of November 20, 2010. 
 
25 NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance’s 
collective defence clause, see NATO, “Collective defence,” http:// 
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_59378.htm; See also “State- 
ment by the North Atlantic Council of 12 Sept 2001," http://www. 
nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm. 
management. Countering new hybrid threats and taking the 
lead in future joint multi-stakeholder  threat-based responses 
could have resulted in a new role for NATO as a facilitator 
of peace and stability operations. 
Of particular relevance in the context of hybrid threats is 
the danger of the proliferation of advanced weapon systems 
by non-state actors (NSAs) associated with radical Islam, as 
well as their increasing use of new technologies. The last 
Israel - Gaza conflict highlights these developments: new 
technologically advanced rocket systems, supplied  by Iran 
to their terrorist proxy Hamas, were used against Israel. The 
Fajr (Dawn) 5 rocket’s capability to reach both Tel Aviv and 
Jerusalem has once more shown the vulnerability of Israel 
as a state when it comes to conventional kinetic threats. 
Such conventional military and security threats are 
supplemented by the use of new communication technolo- 
gies, which are used to influence the Western opinion in 
favor of Hamas – the newest Gaza conflict is thus an excel- 
lent example of how multimodal threats, asymmetric terror, 
and warfare are supplemented by terrorist disinformation 
campaigns. Hamas has been employing tools and strate- 
gies of disinformation normally associated with clandestine 
psychological operations of traditional military state ac- 
tors, such as sending emails and text messages with hoax 
news updates, as well as propaganda  slogans to Israeli and 
non-Israeli  Internet  addresses and cellphones and the use 
of the Internet to disseminate propaganda.26  Text messages 
during the eight days of conflict were sent, which warned 
that “Gaza will turn into the graveyard of your soldiers and 
Tel Aviv will become a fireball”.27 It is likely that hybrid and 
‘joint’ operations of non-state actors, terrorist organizations 
will become more frequent. 
Additionally, the capacity for non-state actors to copy the 
command and control structures of conventional mili- tary 
has increased with the readily availability of mass-pro- 
duced information technology and the possibility to tap into 
open sources for ‘data mining.’ These developments have 
changed the traditional view of asymmetric warfare, where 
 
26  L. Marcus, “Explosive New Arab Music Video: ‘Strike a Blow at Tel 
Aviv,’” Jewish Press, November 19, 2012, http://www.jewishpress. 
com/. 
 
27  Jaber Hala, “Hamas goes underground to avoid drones," The 
Sunday Times, November 25, 2012, 27. 
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an AK-47 and the insurgents’ morale were traditional the 
only and often most important factors in achieving victory. 
The asymmetric warfare concept used to be an idiom to de- 
scribe war against opponents who used to be also weaker in 
terms of available weaponry and utilization of technology. 
Thus, despite NATO’s failure to agree to a joint and 
comprehensive approach in countering hybrid threats, there 
is little doubt that “hybrid threats are here to stay.”28 Even a 
mainly conventional war will have a ‘hybrid’ element such 
as a cyber-attack or bio-hacking. Future attackers will rely 
increasingly on technological and scientific ways to execute 
their operations and one of the documented examples 
is the use of ‘cyber’ for carrying out or controlling hybrid 
threats. 
 
The Role of “Cyber” in Hybrid Threat 
Scenarios 
Such conventional military and security threats are supple- 
mented by the use of new technologies.  The advent of 
‘Cyber conflict’ and ‘Cyber War’ serves as examples  for the 
use of new technologies within the scope of hybrid threats. 
Cyber War29 refers to a sustained computer based cyber- 
attack by a state (or non-state actor) against the informa- 
tion technology infrastructure of a target state. An example 
of such hostile action occurring in the fifth dimension of 
warfare is the 2007 Russian attempt to virtually block out 
Estonia’s Internet  infrastructure  as a unilateral counter- 
measure and retribution for Estonia’s removal of a Second 
World War Soviet memorial from the center of the city of 
Tallinn.30 This incident was followed by the employment of 
sophisticated cyber operations against Georgia in 2008. 
The most recent report of sophisticated cyber weaponry 
was Stuxnet, a virus that sabotaged Iran’s nuclear weapons 
program. Presumably employed by Israel, it highlighted the 
technical  advancement  possibilities, as well as the poten- 
tial of such means in the fifth dimension of warfare.31  The 
continuing and intensifying employment of cyber attacks 
by China against the United States, NATO, the European 
Union and the rest of the world has led the U.S. to respond 
by establishing a central Cyber War Command, the United 
States Cyber Command  (USCYBERCOM) in 201032 to 
“conduct full-spectrum military cyberspace operations in 
order to enable actions in all domains, ensure U.S./allied 
freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to their 
adversaries.”33  Following these developments and, perhaps 
supplementing the work of USCYBERCOM, NATO set up a 
special hybrid threat study group, which is studying possible 
responses to such threats: the NATO Transnet network on 
Countering Hybrid Threats (CHT).34 
‘Cyber’ in the context of armed conflict does not 
necessarily establish genuinely new categories of conflict; 
rather it constitutes another and improved tool of warfare. 
The military will find new ways to conduct its operations 
using ‘cyber’ as a force multiplier and operational capabil- 
ity enhancer, and will continue to operate on the tactical, 
operational or strategic level. The increasing use of cyber 
by non-state actors to further their economic, political and 
other interests, and the present problem of clear accredita- 
tion of the originators of cyber activities makes it increasing- 
ly hard to identify and counter such threats. Terrorist nation 
state actors (or terrorist proxies of a state sponsor such as 
Iran and Syria) are increasingly using cyber capabilities to 
augment their attack capabilities. 
Apart from the above mentioned use of ‘cyber’ as a 
means of disinformation during the last Israel-Gaza conflict, 
another example for the role of social media  as a enhancer 
for terrorist activities can be found in the Mumbai attacks 
in India in 2008. Terrorists from Pakistan attacked the city, 
 
 
 
 
28  SNDC Hybrid Threat Workshop, Swedish Armed Forces represen- 
tative. 
 
29  See generally, Jenny Döge “Cyber Warfare. Challenges for the 
Applicability of the Traditional Laws of War Regime,” Archiv des 
Völkerrechts, (2010): 486. 
 
30  See Ian Traynor, “Russian accused of unleashing cyberwar to 
disable Estonia," The Guardian, May 17, 2007, http://www.guardian. 
co.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia. 
31  Christopher Williams, “Stuxnet: Cyber-attack on Iran ‘was carried 
out by Western powers and Israel,’” The Telegraph, Jan. 21, 2011, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/8274009/Stuxnet-Cyber- 
attack-on-Iran-was-carried-out-by-Western-powers-and-Israel.html. 
 
32  With the decision taken in 2009, and initial operational capabil- 
ity as of 2010, see United States Strategic Command http://www. 
stratcom.mil/factsheets/Cyber_Command/. 
 
33  Ibid. 
 
34  See NATO Transformation Network, https://transnet.act.nato.int/ 
WISE/Transforma1/ACTIPT/JOUIPT. 
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with a particular focus on the Taj Mahal hotel.35 Tactical 
intelligence during the raid was gathered from social media 
and the exploitation of existing mass media  such as cable- 
TV, while home electronic equipment and cell phones 
were used as means of ‘command and control’. Handlers 
directed the terrorists on the ground; they stood in perma- 
nent cell phone contact with the field operators in Mumbai, 
and were able to use both Internet and major television 
channels for updates on the evolving situation on the 
ground, comparable to a Situation Report (SITREP) used by 
conventional armed forces. Live coverage of the attacks was 
made available by news channels, and as a novelty, by the 
social media, such as Flickr, Twitter and Facebook. 
The operation’s handlers ‘data mined’ and compiled this 
information in real time and communicated operation rele- 
vant information directly to the terrorists through the use of 
smart phones. For example, the terrorists received the infor- 
mation from their handlers that the antiterrorist commander 
in charge of Mumbai security had been killed in action. This 
had been data mined from open live sources and commu- 
nicated directly to the terrorists who had little knowledge 
about this early ‘success’ of their action. The terrorists also 
got reports that people panicked and were running for their 
lives, something everyone saw on the television. 
Consequently, the terrorists received direct instructions 
to add to the panic by detonating hand grenades at regu- 
lar intervals. After television reports indicated that there 
were three Indian ministers in the hotel, the terrorists were 
ordered by their handlers to kill or capture them.36 The ter- 
rorists were also informed of tactical developments outside 
the hotel and instructed to attack specific targets among 
the police and security forces. When an anti-terrorist squad 
landed on the roof, warnings were issued and the terrorists 
subsequently engaged the squad.37 
The Mumbai example illustrates the amazing readiness, 
availability, and affordability of using new technologies for 
setting up an effective and workable system of ‘command 
and control’. This observation  is a post Cold War reality and 
 
 
35  Some of the following content derives from Swedish National 
a direct result of globalization and technical advancement. 
Moreover, the volume of publicly available electronic infor- 
mation is staggering. In urban areas, one can find tactical 
information by simply tapping open sources or into closed, 
protected  sources such as CCTV (closed-circuit television), 
or documents in ‘data cloud’ solutions. 
The ways of accessing information in cyberspace are 
changing rapidly and are becoming increasingly hard 
to counter. One recent example of an ingenious way of 
‘hacking’ into otherwise protected  sources involved the use 
of Google programs for inserting a ‘backdoor’ Trojan for 
the purpose of later data theft.38 Using the Google server, 
hackers bypassed any firewall used by the ‘target.’ Another 
example of using an otherwise ‘innocent’ host like Google 
took place in late 2012 when hackers defaced Pakistan’s 
Google domain along with other official Pakistan websites.39 
To summarize these present ‘cyber’ hybrid threats, one 
can state that it is new and readily available technology 
that makes these threats so potent. Command and control 
capabilities may be established in relatively short notice and 
with little effort. The media can be used for influencing 
the public opinion as a means of psychological operations 
(PSYOPS), both at home and abroad. Cyber threats strike at 
the core of modern warfare by affecting command and con- 
trol abilities, which have become increasingly vulnerable 
to cyber-attack. Such cyber threat capabilities also strike at 
the core of our post-industrial, modern society. The use of 
‘cyber’ as a threat category on its own or as an aiding tool 
for carrying out other multi-modal attacks is highly likely to 
increase, and consequently its overall role within the con- 
text of hybrid threats will rise. 
 
Countering Hybrid Threats – Implica- 
tions for Military Doctrine 
Military doctrine intentionally centers on a military perspec- 
tive that reflects the particular  necessities and capabilities of 
the armed forces. NATO’s inability to formulate a binding 
comprehensive approach to hybrid threats (which would 
combine conventional threat elements with unknown, 
‘hybrid’ threat elements as a potential trigger for a NATO 
Defence College sources which are on file with the authors.    
 
36  See http://islamicterrorism.wordpress.com/2009/01/07/chilling- 
phone-transcripts-of-mumbai-terrorists-with-their-lashkar-handlers/. 
 
37  See http://www.rediff.com/news/2009/mar/18sld4-book-extract- 
of-mumbai-attacked.htm. 
 
38See http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/10454/malware/malware- 
hides-cc-server-communications-using-google-docs-function.html. 
 
39  See http://tribune.com.pk/story/470924/cyber-vandalism-hack- 
ers-deface-google-pakistan/. 
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Article 5 response) is a testament to the perseverance of an 
overwhelmingly conservative military doctrinal approach. 
The danger in this approach is that the failure to prepare 
for 21st century threats by adhering to traditional concepts 
of counterinsurgency (COIN) and traditional international 
conflict scenarios, might lead to a lack of preparedness and 
vulnerability in the future. This failure of defining a NATO 
policy on countering hybrid threats is even more unfor- 
tunate given that the U.S. has a national military security 
strategy in place that recognizes certain hybrid elements  as 
threats to its national security.40 
This failure to adapt at NATO’s organizational level may 
stem from a continuing Cold War rooted psychology among 
the political actors. During the Cold War, the world was 
locked into an intellectual doctrinal approach, which viewed 
all conflicts in the context of the global ideological struggle 
coded political paradigm of its time. Once the Cold War 
came to an end in 1991, new national conflicts arose along 
once pacified conflict lines. This new era manifested itself 
in the terrible conflicts in the Balkans as a conse- quence of 
the breakup of the old communist regime, and the various 
conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union. While 
the Cold War was not necessarily only about the conflict 
between two opposing superpowers, nor exclu- sively 
about ideological confrontation, it nevertheless led to a strict 
division of the world and its conflicts into two major 
ideological  spheres with only few exceptions, namely the 
U.S. led West versus the Soviet led East. This division  made 
potential threats more foreseeable and even ‘manageable.’ 
The end of the Cold War gave rise to a new way of 
thinking, which was no longer based solely on techno- 
logical capabilities and/or sheer numerical superiority. It 
is possible to view the European postmodernism and the 
‘fourth generation warfare’ of post 9/11 as parallel  tracks; 
with the latter challenging Western positivistic materialism’s 
paradigm.41 While military academics in the Western world 
do not lack warnings about the new challenges brought 
by these changes, it will eventually be up to politicians to 
‘drive’ new initiatives; a prospect often marred by ‘realpoli- 
tik,’ which will determine any policy in the end. 
How does that affect military and security doctrines? 
Doctrinal changes for the military will depend on how the 
laws of war and the use of force will be shaped and it will 
in its turn be shaped by the practice of those who should 
adhere to it. This has been highlighted  by examples where 
legitimacy has been ignored on behalf of ‘realpolitik,’ as the 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq show. 
What one can hope for in military doctrine is an inte- 
grated protection from conventional interstate aggression 
as well as from new hybrid threats. One such example is 
the recent suggestion by the United Nations that states 
should be more proactive when it comes to fighting the use 
of the Internet by terrorists.42  Only society  as a whole can 
protect itself, a task that is not limited to the military. This is 
even more important in times of shrinking military budgets, 
which will likely continue for the foreseeable future. An in- 
tegration of the capabilities at an interstate level, something 
NATO refers to as ‘Smart Defence’, and increased defense 
cooperation, may be the only way to counter the multitude 
of evolving threats in the future. 
Hybrid threats challenge Clausewitz’s dogma of war, 
which constituted “a mere continuation of [state] politics by 
other means,” and might degrade his definition of a perma- 
nent state of war. NATO’s failure to formulate a comprehen- 
sive response strategy to asymmetric and ‘hybrid’ threats is 
an omission which will come at a cost in the future. Inter- 
national cooperation on capabilities  is the sine qua non of 
future defense strategies that respond to existent threats and 
prepare for evolving new threats. Such preparation reminds 
us of Sun-Tzu when he provided: “victorious warriors win 
first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war 
first and then seek to win.” 43 
 
 
40See e.g. The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America, September 2012, http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2002.pdf. 
 
41  The ideas of the extreme Wahhabism (the religious fundament 
advocated by al-Qaeda), that man should live in the same techno- 
logical conditions as Muhammad, is easily linked to the ideas behind 
fourth generation warfare. 
 
42  See United Nations Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force, 
“The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes,” http://www.unodc. 
org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes. 
pdf. 
 
43  Sun-Tzu, The Art of War, (Simon and Brown, 2011): ch. 4. 
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Concluding Observations on Future 
Military Challenges within a Political and 
Legal Context 
This article was written with the intention to introduce the 
21st century “hybrid threat” to a wide audience, despite 
NATO’s decision not to adopt a comprehensive approach. 
This failure does not reduce the dangers of this category of 
global risk. On-going debate and academic engagement 
with the topic and rationale of the hybrid threat, such as the 
Swedish experiment in 2012, will hopefully lead to height- 
ened awareness and eventual preparedness. 
This submission concludes with a sobering prediction: the 
present legal concepts on the use of military force - the jus 
ad bellum - have become relatively anachronistic and 
partially outdated, which will not suffice when dealing with 
the present security threats and challenges of the 21st Cen- 
tury. The U.S. National  Security Strategy of 2002 was de- 
signed to authorize U.S. President George W. Bush’s admin- 
istration to take pre-emptive action whenever the “United 
States cannot remain  idle while dangers gather,”44and was 
meant to counter threats which involve the use of weapons 
of mass destruction45 by rogue states and terrorist non-state 
actors, such as al-Qaeda.  The emergence of new threats 
makes an extension of this doctrine not unlikely. 
With such changes to traditional military doctrine, a 
change of legal paradigms will be inevitable. New adaptive 
means and methods of ‘flexible responsiveness’ through es- 
calating levels of confrontation and deterrence will question 
the existing prohibition of the use of force, with its limited 
exceptions under Articles 2(4), 51 of the U.N. Charter and 
Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Also, future direct intervention 
in failed state scenarios will require flexibility with choices 
of military assets and objectives. The present concept of 
crisis management response can easily develop into a more 
pronounced military engagement of an increasingly ‘force- 
ful’ nature.46 
 
 
44  The White House, “The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America,” National Security Strategy Archive, September 
2002, http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2002.pdf. 
 
45  “Weapons of mass destruction” refer to nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons. 
 
46  The 2004 Tsunami disaster relief saw civil relief efforts comple- 
mented by military efforts and assets to enhance own relief efforts, 
and to provide military protection in terms of ‘force protection.’ 
Future responses to multimodal threats will include the 
kinetic force options directed against – most presum- ably – 
non-state actors. They will affect our present views on the 
legality of the use of force in international  relations, as 
enshrined in Articles 2 (4) of the U.N. Charter with the 
limited exceptions available under Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter, namely individual and collective self-defense,47   as 
well as Security  Council authorization. Already, the contin- 
ued use of ‘UAVs’ (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, or ‘drones’) 
for targeted killing operations effectively emphasizes the 
legal challenges ahead. The ongoing kill operations in the 
tribal areas of Waziristan/Pakistan demonstrate how quick 
the critical threshold of an armed conflict can be reached 
and even surpassed. These operations clearly fall within the 
scope of ‘armed conflict’, as defined by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. 
Dusko Tadic.48  Thus, these operations give rise to the appli- 
cability of the norms of the law of armed conflict, the body 
of international humanitarian law governing conduct in war. 
However, the ‘lawfulness’ of such operations requires 
the existence of either a mandate in terms of Article 51 
of the U.N. Charter49 or the existence of an illegal armed 
attack in order to exercise a right to national or state 
self-defense in terms of Article 51. Whether such military 
operations are within the scope of these categories remains 
open to discussion. Indeed, highly relevant to this context 
is the newly codified Article 8bis of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, which criminalizes acts of 
aggression, and excludes the non-state actor as a possible 
target/victim. Consequently, such kinetic operations against 
non-state actors50  remain outside its scope of applicability 
and may lead to accountability issues. 
Certain legal considerations are important in regard to 
 
 
47  North Atlantic Treaty, Art. 5, April 4, 1949, 34 U.N.T.S., at 243. 
 
48  Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 105 ILR 419, 488, 
Appeal Judgment, (July 19, 1999). 
 
49  A Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force in an 
Enforcement and Peace Enforcement Operation context. 
 
50  Cf. the Israel Defense Forces’ operations during the 2006 Second 
Lebanon War against Hezbollah and Operation Cast Lead against 
Hamas in 2008/2009 as well as the continuing use of UAVs/drones 
against enemy targets from the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. 
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hybrid threats, which may include kinetic threats but do not 
exclude non-kinetic threats such as cyber-attacks,  as long 
as a military response is considered  as a counter-option. 
Hybrid threats include threats stemming from transnational 
terrorism and other low intensity, asymmetric conflicts. 
In addition, post-9/11 transnational terrorism may have 
changed the perception that jus ad bellum was only appli- 
cable on inter-state international conflicts.51 
Furthermore, the recent Kampala definition of the crime 
of aggression52 may have to be amended when it comes 
to countering hybrid threats, as non-state actors do not fall 
within the definition on the crime of aggression, whether 
they are perpetrators or victims. The new Article 8bis of the 
Rome Statute at the Kampala Review Conference in June 
201053 does not recognize the contemporary role which 
non-state actors play in the context of the aggression.54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51  Pre-9/11 examples of engaging in military action against foreign 
terrorists led mostly to condemnation as a violation of Art. 2 (4) UN 
Charter, see the U.S. Operation El Dorado Canyon of 1986 against 
Libyan terrorist targets or the hot pursuit operations by SADF against 
ANC, MK and SWAPO, and more recently long range operations of 
the IDF against terrorist infrastructure in Khartoum, Sudan. For a 
legal analysis of the changing nature of asymmetric war, see Sascha- 
Dominik Bachmann, Targeted Killings: Contemporary Challenges, 
Risks And Opportunities, 18(2) J. Conflict Security and L. 259 (2013). 
 
52  See Sascha-Dominik Bachmann and Gerhard Kemp, Aggression 
as ‘Organized Hypocrisy’ – How the War on Terrorism And Hybrid 
Threats Challenge The Nuremberg Legacy, 30 Windsor Y.B. Access 
Just. 233 (2012). 
 
53 See Res.RC/Res.6, advance version, 16 June 2010 online: Interna- 
tional Criminal Court <http://www.icc-cpi.int>. 
 
54  The definition of “Crime of Aggression” to be included in the 
Rome Statute in 2017 reads: 
 
Article 8bis. Crime of aggression.  1. For the purpose of this Statute, 
Aggression under article 8bis is now a leadership crime.55 
The language seems to suggest a stricter approach than the 
Nuremberg process, where individual liability was framed 
with reference to individuals who could “shape or influence 
policy.” “Effective control” under Article 8bis could limit 
individual liability to the exclusion of individuals who, for 
instance, merely influenced policy.56 This view of ‘leader- 
ship’, combined with the state-centric approach to the 
crime of aggression, underscores the difficulty in extend- ing 
the crime of aggression to “post-bureaucratic forms of 
organization  as represented,  for example, by paramilitary or 
terrorist non-State actors,” such as Hamas or Hezbollah.57 
The legal implications of the definition of aggression for the 
“post-9/11” world, as well as for possible military responses 
to new hybrid threats by non-state actors remain to be 
seen. 
If NATO decided to adopt the comprehensive approach 
as part of its strategic framework,  then this would also be 
beneficial for shaping its future role. NATO faces the pros- 
pect of changing mission roles, shrinking national defense 
budgets and general identity issues surrounding organiza- 
tion its existence: its traditional role as provider  of military 
capabilities for its member  states, as part of a collective 
self defense effort, or for the U.N., in cases of U.N. Charter 
Article 51 authorizations would have been complemented 
by tasks of global risk and crisis management. Countering 
new hybrid threats and taking the lead in future joint multi- 
stakeholder threat-based  responses could have resulted in 
a new role for NATO as a facilitator of peace and stability 
operations. 
NATO’s Strategic Concept of 2010 was aimed at preven- 
tion, as well as deterrence,  and aims at developing a holistic 
or comprehensive approach to a variety of new conflict 
scenarios of multimodal or hybrid threats: from kinetic 
combat operations to multi-stakeholder  based non-kinetic 
“crime of aggression” means the planning, preparation, initiation or    
execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control 
over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act 
of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes 
a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.  2. For 
the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the use of 
armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
or political independence of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of the fol- 
lowing acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance 
with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 
December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression. 
55  Art 8bis(1) read with art 25 (3bis); see analysis of G. Kemp, 
Individual Criminal Liability for the International Crime of Aggres- 
sion (Belgium: Intersentia, 2010) 236-237; Kai Ambos, The Crime of 
Aggression after Kampala, 53 German Y.B. of Int’l Law 463, 468 
(2010). 
 
56  Ambos, 53 German Y.B. of Int’l Law, 468; For a more nuanced 
view on “leadership," see G. Kemp, Individual Criminal Liability for 
the International Crime of Aggression, 236-237. 
 
57  Ambos, 53 German Y.B. of Int’l Law, 492. 
60  Cf Article 49 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Con- 
ventions. 
law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1809?rskey=TOSNY 
w&result=5&prd=EPIL. 
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responses.58  Even with the failure to formulate a binding 
comprehensive approach to such threats at the suprana- 
tional level, the findings of NATO’s hybrid workshops have 
shown the significance of such threats and the need to re- 
spond in a flexible way. The repercussions for international 
lawyers in terms of possible responses to such challenges 
are significant, and have not yet been discussed in terms 
of their full possible impact for the way we define war and 
peace within the concept of armed attack and individual 
and collective self-defense. 
 
Conclusion 
Hybrid threats will dominate the conflicts of the future, and 
will be no less serious than the conflicts of the 20th century. 
New roles are needed for national  militaries,  as well as for 
non-state actors, such as multinational corporations and 
non-governmental organizations. The “War on Terror” il- 
lustrated that the term “geography” has become obsolete; 
it created abstract categories of distinction into ‘abroad,’ 
such as ‘Mission Area,’ ‘Area of Operations’ and ‘Theatre of 
Operation;’ and ‘at home’ having merged into one abstract 
universal ‘battlefield’. The use of ‘flexible response,’ which 
has often been regarded as a tenet in military operational 
thinking and doctrine, has lost much of its meaning  as a 
means of military force projection within the context of 
hybrid threats. 
Again, the intention of this article is to introduce the 
21st century ‘hybrid threat’ to a wider audience. Ongoing 
debate and academic engagement with the topic and ratio- 
nale of ‘hybrid threats,’  such as the Swedish experiment in 
2012, will hopefully lead to greater awareness. In addition, 
the authors believe that the definition of ‘armed attack’ 
will continue to change in the post-9/11 environment,59 
and will eventually give rise to a significant change in the 
present body of international law regulating jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello.60 Reflecting on the current U.S. National 
Security Strategy, and on a recent analysis by Professor Dr. 
Heintschel von Heinegg61on the consequences of asym- 
metric warfare for the law of armed conflict, one likely 
consequence may be that nations will use military force to 
counter hybrid attacks (including cyber-attacks). 
Hybrid threats as such are not new threats; new is 
the recognition that such multimodal threats command a 
‘holistic’ approach, which combines traditional and non- 
traditional responses by state and non-state  actors such as 
multinational corporations. Responses to hybrid threats 
must be proportionate and measured: from civil defence 
and police responses to COIN and the use of military force. 
The authors therefore predict that the emergence of hybrid 
threats and their recognition as potential  threats to peace 
and security, the proliferation of low threshold regional 
conflicts  (such as the Libyan 2011 conflict and Syria), and 
continuing  asymmetric warfare scenarios (such as the on- 
going operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan) will have a 
significant impact on the prevailing culture and prism of 
traditional military activity, which is still influenced by con- 
cepts from the last century. 
Hybrid threats pose not only security challenges but also 
legal difficulties. Only time will tell how Western states, 
through military doctrinal reform, will adapt within their 
existing legal and operational frameworks. 
 
 
58  See 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ 
natolive/topics_82705.htm. 
 
59  U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1368 of September 12, 2001    
(U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001) and 1373 of September 28, 2001 
(U.N.Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001), both affirming the right of the US “of 
individual or collective self defence in accordance with the Charter”. 
61  Dr. Wolff Heintschel von Heineggl, “Max Planck Encyclo- 
pedia of Public International Law: Asymmetric Warfare,” Ox- 
ford University Press, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/ 
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